Purifying the PLA-Xi's pet project

Hong Kong, February 10 (ANI): Chairman Xi Jinping is rolling out a major education program to instil required levels of loyalty within the country's massive and highly politicized military.
The campaign is directed at top members of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) because Xi believes their personal fealty to his ideological cause is inadequate.
Mao Zedong had a famous dictum that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. But Xi is worried the hands directly holding those guns do not share his vision of the supremacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He has to make sure those gun-wielding hands are steady and will do his bidding, and never turn the barrel against him.
On February 4 , Xi announced the rollout of his education initiative, an early indication that anti-corruption measures will pick up in 2025. It is being enforced by the Political Work Department of the all-powerful Central Military Commission (CMC), which Xi heads.
The campaign focuses on the "key few", a reference to senior officials possessing critical decision-making authority. The notice was issued on the final day of China's Lunar New Year break, meaning it would be the first thing returnees dealt with after their longest holiday of the year.
Xi's confidence in the PLA has been shaken by one scandal after another. It seems that innumerable top figures may be in the military to line their own pockets or to gain nefarious advantages that have nothing to do with advancing Xi's vision. Of course, this is the challenge every communist regime encounters. Instead of empowering the masses, communism creates a formidable cabal at the top who cling tightly to power.
Instead of passionately promoting the ideals of Chinese socialism espoused by Xi, it turns out many in the PLA would actually like to garner personal power, and influence and make money instead. This is disappointing to Xi, but how can one man, despite the pervasive security and intelligence apparatus behind him, transform the root motivations of human hearts?
Top PLA or defence industry luminaries have been ensnared in corruption investigations one after the other. Indeed, the stream of bad news seems endless.
Admiral Miao Hua, a member of the CMC, fell last November. He followed former defense minister Li Shangfu who was expelled earlier. This left the seven-man CMC absent two members, an unprecedented situation.
The previous defence minister, Wei Fenghe, was also dismissed in June for violations of political and organizational discipline by helping others gain improper benefits in personnel arrangements. He also seriously violated discipline regarding integrity, accepting money and gifts.
The investigation found that Wei's crimes had "a highly detrimental impact and caused tremendous harm". He was charged with losing his faith and loyalty, severely contaminating the military's political environment, and bringing enormous damage to the party's cause.
Elsewhere, nine senior generals - which include former or present commanders of the PLA Rocket Force and PLA Air Force, and officials in charge of the Equipment Development Department - were formally removed from their posts at the National People's Congress in December 2023.
Add to this the disappearance of heads of defence corporations such as Zhou Xinmin of the Aviation Corporation of China (AVIC). The clean-up continues unabated too.
According to the South China Morning Post, various managers failed to appear at Chinese New Year celebrations, and their profiles have been inexplicably removed from company websites.
These include figures like Yu Jianfeng, chairman of the China National Nuclear Corporation; Hao Zhaoping, general manager of AVIC; Yang Wei, an AVIC deputy general manager and lead engineer on China's J-20 stealth fighter program; Xu Xianping, chairman of the China Ordnance Equipment Group; and Liu Dashan, general manager of the China Ordnance Industry Group.
William Mathews, a Senior Research Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Program of Chatham House, said Xi's campaigns indicate that "loyalty and control of the military is more important than avoiding shorter-term instability in command structure and significant embarrassment. This reflects the seriousness with which Xi is taking his ambitions for the PLA, but also has implications for the perception of actual Chinese fighting capability abroad."
Mathews noted that China's military-industrial capacity is greater than that of the USA, that its weapons represent real threats to American bases in the West Pacific, and that any US victory in a potential Taiwan conflict could only come at an incredible cost.
He added, "However, material capability is of limited use if not backed up by an effective command structure. Systemic corruption and concerns over loyalty and control have led Xi to extensive purges of the PLA and its associated industrial complex, alongside measures to restructure the PLA for an era of new military technology."
Mathews wrote, "Together with the anti-corruption drive, of which Miao is the latest victim, this shows that in Xi's mind, a politically compliant and minimally corrupt PLA equals a combat-ready PLA. To Xi, any short- to medium-term instability at the highest levels of the PLA command structure - and the reputational costs that incurs - is a price worth paying to achieve his goal."
Ultimately, Xi would like to achieve what Mao was never able to do - capture Taiwan and enfold it into the bosom of the CCP. To do that he must purify the PLA of defiled motives and bend it to his will. Xi must also remove any notion that he is losing his grip on power or his influence over the PLA.
So, what does Xi's military loyalty program entail? The text said the party should "focus on the key few, to strengthen learning and ideological transformation" in order to "truly achieve greater actual results in learning, understanding, believing and application" of Xi's sage military thought. Indeed, Xi's political thought has the power to "unite hearts and forge souls" as personnel "deeply and persistently" - in other words, repeatedly - study Xi's original thoughts on strengthening the military.
Instead of actually devoting themselves to the tactics of war and improving the PLA's combat capability, top leaders must spend countless hours reading, studying and discussing Xi's ruminations. Of course, such admonitions will also filter down to all the ranks.
Let it be remembered that Xi has never professionally served in the military, so this is not about mastering tactics and strategy. This is purely and simply an effort to rid the PLA of all disloyalty and personal ambition, and to instead assert Xi's own ambitions over this unwieldy organization.
This political education campaign seemingly had its roots in a political work conference held by the CMC in June 2024, where Xi expressed his dissatisfaction. His anger must only have grown exponentially from scandals since then. Xi said at that conference last year, alluding to Mao's maxim, "We must make it clear that the barrels of the guns must always be in the hands of those who are loyal and reliable to the party And we must make it clear that there is no place for corrupt elements in the military."
Ironically, the now-disgraced Miao, head of the Political Work Department, was the one in charge of rolling out Xi's political loyalty program. He was there at the June conference advocating loyalty and integrity, and he was designated to implement the program.
His investigation and arrest would have completely disrupted this effort, which explains the seven-month delay for Xi to announce this initiative. How does Xi explain to the rank and file in the PLA that their leaders and commanders cannot be trusted? With so many tarred by corruption, how can Xi restore the trust of these soldiers, sailors and airmen? Anti-corruption efforts and political loyalty efforts are not new in the PLA, yet in the past, they seem to have made no difference. It might seem a lost cause, but Xi simultaneously instructed the PLA to focus on centenary goals, ensure combat readiness put lessons into practice, and carry out special education.
Xi has watched the lackadaisical attitude of the Russian military in its prosecution of the Ukraine war. Many Russian soldiers have no fighting spirit in prosecuting tsarist Vladimir Putin's plans. Xi cannot allow the same thing to happen to the PLA. Indeed, political work (Chinese speak for political indoctrination) is regarded as a "magic weapon" for China's military.
Xi needs the PLA to be united in its vision for China, for conquering Taiwan and, if need be, to take on and defeat the USA.
Regardless, Mathews pointed out that Xi's approach comes with attendant risks. "In addition to the reputational costs to Xi himself as CCP and CMC chairman, whose personal appointments suggest a pattern of misjudgment, there are consequences for how the PLA is seen by potential adversaries."
Miao and many others were personally appointed by Xi. If China's leader, who holds demigod status, cannot divine the true motives of his proteges, then how can there be any trust in anyone? If the ones responsible for ideological conformity do not themselves believe it, what hope is there? The Chatham House academic continued, "As Beijing seeks to deter US and allied involvement in a potential Taiwan conflict, any perception of a leadership unable to command effectively or keep on top of discipline risks undermining belief in the PLA's ability to coordinate its branches and implement its doctrine effectively."
Mathews continued: "This has the potential to increase the appetite for risk on the part of Beijing's adversaries when it comes to confronting China's efforts to coerce Taiwan and assert its claims in the South China Sea." Likewise, it could add weight to the perception that the PLA's lack of combat experience places it at a disadvantage in any conflict involving the USA.
On the other hand, the USA has not faced a peer competitor for decades either, so this may be a moot point. It was Mathews' opinion that this political loyalty campaign would not affect Beijing's strategy of wearing down Taiwan through military coercion and multi-pronged "gray zone" tactics.
On the contrary, China may up the ante further to mitigate against any perceived weakness.
In fact, PLA aircraft incursions into Taiwan's air defence identification zone reached unprecedented levels in 2024. The number of sorties and days on which these occurred throughout last year rose. However, the real marked change was in the percentage of sorties that crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait. These were far higher in 2024 compared to a year earlier. Last year, there were 3,070 crossings of the median line by Chinese military aircraft.
These were among the total of 5,105 annual sorties conducted in 2024, compared to 4,711 in 2023. It seems unlikely Xi would start a war of conquest against Taiwan until he has full confidence in the PLA. On a positive note, that may take some time given the PLA's track record of corruption.
As Mathews assessed, "The importance of success would be so high, and so vital to his legitimacy, that the gamble is too risky unless the outcome is all but guaranteed."
However, it may well be that the PLA's combat effectiveness is not unduly affected by the arrests of leading commanders. A recent report published by the US Naval War College, penned by Christopher Sharman and Andrew Erickson, examined the conviction of Vice Admiral Li Pengcheng, commander of the Southern Theater Command.
Li was on a fast-track career until he was detained. His dismissal meant he met the same fate as his predecessor Vice Admiral Ju Xinchun. The authors noted, "The PLA Navy (PLAN) may be playing high stakes musical chairs with its leadership, but it has a deep enough talent pool to do so without prohibitive problems.
When one leader is purged, another is on deck. Politicized corruption investigations and their imposition of costs are fundamentally a speedbump rather than a showstopper."
Furthermore, the American professors assessed, "Regardless of corruption's pervasive persistence, PLAN operational capabilities continue to improve, and cutting-edge, lethal weapons systems regularly enter service.
Corruption may contribute to inefficiencies, but it does not curtail PLAN advances. Related removals are neither an indicator of prohibitive incompetence nor a self-defeating constraint on operational capabilities." (ANI)